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Abstract
Two piloted simulation experiments were conducted
by NLR, in 1994 and 1996, to evaluate a number of
novel windshear icon displays, driven either by a
scanning laser (1994) or by an Airborne Doppler
(weather) Radar (ADR) (1996). In addition several
flight procedures of coping with the windshear threat
information were also evaluated, in terms of speed
additives (1994) or aircraft configuration changes
(1996). In the experiment of 1994 also the concept of
speed feedback was evaluated: this concept raised the
alert thresholds used to warn the crew of windshear
whenever the pilot increased the approach speed set
in the Autothrottle. This speed feedback concept,
although initially appreciated much by the pilots, was
later denounced due to its tendency to induce crews
to penetrate the windshear. The windshear icon
displays evaluated were liked very much by the
pilots. Especially the ADR was favored because of
its “natural” interface in the cockpit, allowing pilots
to correlate weather information with windshear
information. Its drawback of not being useful in case
of “dry” microbursts (MBs) becomes less significant
the lower the (dBZ) level becomes at which
precipitation can still be detected. Integrating the
ADR with the reactive sensor was found to be a good
protection feature, provided a careful tuning of alert
thresholds is done between the two systems. It may
even be advisable to not suppress the caution alert
from the reactive sensor when combined with the
ADR. Overall the icon displays had a positive effect
on situational awareness and on flight safety. The
crew’s workload sometimes increased with the
display, however, depending upon the weather
situation. In some cases it was the workload of the
pilot not flying which increased more than that of the
pilot flying, especially during turning escape
maneuvers to avoid windshear in the go-around.
1 Introduction
At the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR of The
Netherlands, a research program had been underway
since 1990, regarding the subject of windshear on the
approach(1). Several activities were planned
according to a master schedule, in order to prioritize
the available resources for the development of
models and evaluation of new concepts for detection
and display of hazardous weather, especially
windshear. The research effort culminated in 3
experiments (in 1993, 1994 and 1996), performed on
NLR’s moving-base Research Flight Simulator
(RFS), whereby with each experiment new features
were added to the previous one. Preliminary, as well
as more detailed results of the first and second
experiment were reported in ICAS paper 94-7.1.3(1)
and ICAS paper no. 96-3.8.3(2). The final results of
the 1994 experiment have been reported by the
Group of Aerospace Research technologies EURope
(GARTEUR) Action Group FM(AG07)(11). Reports
of the 1993 and 1996 experiments have not (yet)
been released in the public domain.
NASA has for a long time been very active in
evaluating windshear detection systems. A thorough
review of NASA’s activities in this area has been
described by Douglas et al (4). Apart from a prototype
CO2 scanning laser, which was installed on-board
their B737, NASA also evaluated infrared sensors in
1992. An integrated evaluation of several sensors,
such as a scanning laser or windshear radar, in
conjunction with different flight procedures, had not
yet been performed. These areas were addressed by
the research conducted by NLR.
An important aspect of using a forward-looking
windshear detection system, in combination with a
reactive windshear detection system, is how to cope
with the alert information, and what to do in case a
particular alert is generated by one system, and not
by the other. Much thought was given by NLR about
integrating these different types of information, and
how to interface them with newly developed, or
modified flight procedures. Of particular interest was
the so-called Windshear Training Aid(3) (WTA) type
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of go-around in windshear. One of the goals of the
NLR research was to evaluate whether normal go-
around procedures could be used instead.
In the 1994 and 1996 simulation experiments novel
display concepts were tested to display hazardous
windshear. In the experiment of 1994 this was a
scanning laser-driven icon display with an additional
novel feature called “speed feedback”, described
later. The severity of the windshears displayed varied
from an advisory (color blue) to a warning level
(color red). In the last experiment of 1996 an
airborne Doppler radar, with an integrated windshear
detection mode, was used to detect and display only
hazardous windshear.
Description of the experimental objectives and
discussion of results is given in the following
chapters.
2 Experimental objectives
The primary objective in the 1994 experiment was
the evaluation of a windshear hazard icon display. In
this experiment the unique windshear hazard icon
display showed icons of windshear, detected by a
scanning laser. Using the Doppler principle the
windshear was detected by measuring the relative
velocity of the aerosol particles along the laser beam.
The detection performance of the laser deteriorated,
however, when precipitation was present. Detected
windshears were displayed in the form of one or
more icons, of varying size and color.
Other issues investigated(11), but not discussed here,
were the modification of a flight director with a
windshear-stall protection mechanism in the go-
around, the assistance of the pilot with a flight
director or not, and the type of maneuver made in the
go-around procedure, i.e. straight ahead or turning
away from the threat.
The main objective of the 1996 experiment was to
evaluate a windshear hazard display, in conjunction
with an Airborne Doppler weather Radar (ADR),
together with adjusted go-around procedures. Also
here the Doppler principle was used to determine the
windshear threat. Contrary to the icon display in the
1994 experiment, windshear threats below the
warning threshold were not shown. The display of
one or more windshear icons was integrated with the
display of weather, obtained from an ordinary
weather radar. This was done in order to alleviate the
workload in the cockpit, and was also based on pilot
comments from the 1994 experiment.
All windshear scenarios contained various rainfall
conditions so as to allow the effect of precipitation
on the windshear detection performance of the
sensors to be studied.
3 Windshear models used
The windshear models used were of a variety of
types. In the 1994 windshear experiment each
weather scenario consisted of one or more
microbursts, being located in a particular position
(either in the threat position, or not, and of severe
strength or not). Each microburst model consisted of
a combination of one or more ring-vortices, each one
being modeled according to the model of Schultz(5).
In 1994 the FAA, through NASA, released a series of
microburst models of varying precipitation intensity,
in order to have a certification base available to
certify new windshear detection devices developed
by industry(13). Some of these cases were
(numerically simulated) catastrophic windshear cases
such as the Fort-Worth Dallas crash case. In total a
set of 9 such cases was delivered by the FAA on CD-
ROM to NLR for implementation in the research
flight simulator in 1996.
4 Windshear hazard displays used
4.1 Laser icon display
The most interesting feature to be investigated
consisted of a novel type of windshear hazard
display. In the 1994 experiment a scanning laser
scanned ahead of the aircraft. Whenever a particular
windshear, defined by the so-called F-factor being
above certain threshold levels, was detected this data
was converted into a size/diameter and intensity of a
circular-shaped icon, which was displayed on the
navigation display. The diameter of the circular-
shaped icon was determined by the peak-to-peak
distance of the maximum/minimum F-factor(6), while
the color of the icon reflected the intensity of the
hazard, denoted by the factor ‘F’. The color
displayed could range from blue (.04<F<.10), to
amber (.10<F<.21) to red (F>.21). An example of
such a typical icon display is shown in Figure 1. The
value of Fcrit=0.21 was based on the reactive system’s
‘must alert’ boundary for an averaging time of 5
seconds(14).
A special novel feature added to this display was the
introduction of speed feedback. If this concept was
active then, whenever the pilot would increase the
speed regulated by the Autothrottle system by
resetting the so-called “bug speed”, the critical
threshold for F 
 
(e.g. .04, .10 or .21 as given above)
would be increased proportionally. The concept of
speed feedback, and how it interacts with the
warning logic and displays, is shown in Figure 2.
With this concept it is possible that the color of a
displayed icon changes from amber back to blue, for
example. In this regard this concept can provide
additional information to the crew about the intensity
of the windshear.
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The drawback of any type of laser is its sensitivity to
precipitation: the heavier the precipitation, the less
the performance in terms of detection range. This
performance degradation was also modeled in the
simulation experiment using the lidar equation(7), and
could lead to a reduction in icon size, or its
disappearance.
4.2 Windshear radar display
For the 1996 experiment a so-called windshear radar
model was developed and used. Applying the same
Doppler principle as with the laser the radar beam
would detect velocity changes of precipitation
particles within the radar beam, which could be
translated (approximately) into the well-known
windshear hazard F-factor. The inertial speed V, the
gravity g and the range gradient d(..)/dr, operating on
the Doppler speed VDoppler, are combined to calculate
the approximated F-factor, also known as the “radar-
F”, as follows:
[ ]maxmin ,)()( RRrdr
rdV
g
V
rF Doppler ∈=              (1)
where VDoppler is the velocity of the precipitation
particles or aerosols at range r, measured relative to
the aircraft, and equals the difference between the
inertial speed vector V

and the wind speed vector at
range r )(rVW

, projected onto the radar beam as
follows: ( ) erVVrV WDoppler  ⋅−= )()(             (2)
The vector e  is the radar beam direction vector.
Once a certain threshold Fcrit has been exceeded the
area of F>Fcrit will be displayed on the weather radar
display using a particular type of marking, see Figure
3. The basic value of Fcrit was set initially at -0.13 as
required by the FAA(16).
Simultaneously with this type of windshear detector,
also a reactive sensor may be present or not,
depending upon the experimental set-up. Its Fcrit
value was set at -0.105(14). One of the experimental
goals was to determine the added benefit of having a
reactive sensor as well, and to determine possible
confusing operational conditions arising from these
two different types of sensors.
Associated with both the laser and the ADR icon
display is a caution and a warning area relative to the
aircraft, see Figure 4a for the laser and Figure 4b for
the ADR. These areas will be used to generate the
appropriate alerts, depending upon the position of the
icon(s).
Contrary to the drawback of the laser, the Doppler
radar windshear detection function works fine in
precipitation, but its windshear detection function
will be lost in case of a “dry” microburst. New
airborne radars, however, are able to still detect
precipitation levels down to -10 dB, and this has also
been assumed to be the case in this research
investigation. This detection threshold of -10 dB
amounts to a very small amount of precipitation of
about 0.01 mm/h.
5 Go-around procedures evaluated
Any new sensor introduces new questions, such as
how to cope with the information, and what to do
and, if so, how to do it more optimally. Secondary
goals in the 2 experiments described here therefore
were to evaluate flight procedures. In the 1994
experiment, in case of no icon display, especially for
the approach part a particular type of speed
increment procedure was tested in conjunction with
alerts coming from the windshear detection systems
(i.e. laser and/or reactive sensor together).
Concerning the go-around part, in case of a
windshear warning a flight-director, based on the
WTA type of go-around, was compared with a
standard FD in order to see if the WTA type of
(constant) pitch steering, in conjunction with no
configuration changes (i.e. a fixed aircraft
configuration), would provide better flight safety
during the go-around.
In the 1996 experiment a comparison was made
between the fixed configuration (WTA type) and
varying configuration (i.e. retracting flaps and
landing gear on schedule) in the go-around. By
having a full test matrix of such configuration
changes across sensor types (i.e. windshear radar
(ADR), normal weather radar with a reactive sensor,
and both) an evaluation could be made of the flight
safety of the best mix.
6 Alerting aspects
A difficult area concerns the integration of the
various sensor alerts. Both visual cues (i.e. labels on
the primary flight display) as well as aural cues
(voice alerts) were used to alert the crew of an
approaching windshear hazard.
Both visual and aural alerts were generated in
accordance with the requirements of the
FAA(14),(15),(16), JAA(9) and the recommendations from
the SAE(8). Visual windshear alerts depended upon
the type of windshear sensor that detected the
windshear (i.e. sensor-driven concept), and consisted
either of a label “WINDSHEAR AHEAD” presented
on the lower part of the PFD (forward-looking
sensor, e.g. laser or ADR), or the label
“WINDSHEAR” presented on the upper part of the
PFD (Reactive sensor). In case of an advisory alert
(only in the 1994 experiment) the labels were colored
blue, in case of a caution alert the labels were
colored amber, and in case of a warning alert they
were colored red. Furthermore, depending upon the
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hazard level (see below), the alert labels were
accompanied by identical aural cockpit alerts (e.g.
“windshear ahead”), preceded by either the words
“advise”, “caution” or “warning”, in case of an
advisory, caution or warning alert respectively.
6.1 1994 experiment
The hazard levels used in the alerting concept used in
the experiment of 1994 deviated from the
internationally accepted Flight deck Alerting System
(FAS)(8), and are given in Table 1.
The deviation is in hazard levels 2 and 3, where the
caution alert used is based on negative performance
rather than the performance-increasing trend used in
the FAS. This was done in order to bring the piloted
simulation results in line with numerical simulations
done by the Flight Mechanics Action Group
FM(AG05) of GARTEUR(10). This actually brought
the hazard level 2 closer to FAS level 3, as with a
negative performance there is less time to act than in
case of positive performance, and the meaning
“caution” (i.e. no immediate action required) could
no longer be valid. A new definition is hazard level
3, made similar to FAS level 2. In fact a FAS level 3
warning situation is present, however, the hazardous
icon shown on the display is still outside the warning
area (see Fig.4a), and then only a caution alert is
TABLE 1 Hazard levels compared to the standard
   FAS
Hazard
level
FAS
level
Alert type Remark
0 0 Informa-
tive
not used
1 1 Advisory based on negative
performance
2 2 Caution based on negative
performance
3 2 Caution only used with a
display
4 3 Warning
given to the crew. The particular icon is also colored
amber/red (see Fig.1). The moment the FAS-level 3
icon penetrates the warning area a warning alert (i.e.
hazard level 4: “immediate action”) will be given.
The icon color at this time also becomes solid red.
The aural cockpit-alerting concept evaluated was
threat-level based. Even though a sensor alert might
disappear, the hazard level status would not be
reduced during the simulated flight. That is, once a
certain hazard level has been set by a sensor (e.g. 1:
advisory) then only in case of higher hazard level
alerts (e.g. warning) a voice warning will be passed
on to the audio system. PFD alert labels were shown
immediately as long as any one sensor detected a
particular hazard, see also Figure 2.
6.2 1996 experiment
As far as the 1996 experiment is concerned the Flight
deck Alerting System(8) approach was followed for
the reactive sensor. For the ADR sensor the hazard
levels 2 and 4, as defined in Table 1, were used. In
case of a combination of the ADR and the reactive
sensor, the reactive sensor’s caution alert (based on
positive performance) was suppressed, as is common
practice nowadays. For the PFD alert labeling the
same threat-level concept was used as for the 1994
experiment.
7 Risk calculation model
7.1 Risk assessment
An important tool for evaluating the flight safety of a
particular configuration was the use of the NLR-
developed risk assessment model, first used in the
experiment in 1993(1),(2). Compared to 1993 the
model was adapted slightly in order to take into
account the flight risk in the go-around arising from
possible contact with the ground. Based on
calculating the mean and standard deviation of
several flight parameters, use of altitude above
terrain as such would lead to erroneous results for the
go-around phase, as in case of a normal climb-out the
more or less linear trend in altitude would lead to a
large standard deviation, and hence a large calculated
risk of hitting the ground1 probabilities. In the
upgraded model this was circumvented by using the
mean climb rate, in combination with the standard
error. This turned out to work acceptably well: for
all cases where a crash occurred the calculated flight
risk also equaled 1.0 or very close to it. Furthermore,
in the 1996 experiment, the risk model was further
enhanced by also including the landing rollout phase,
calculating the risk of running off the runway for
example.
7.2 General risk model
The general risk model used is comprised of the risk
on the approach, the risk during the landing, or the
risk in the go-around segment (the go-around and
landing events are mutually exclusive), to calculate
the total risk R as follows:( ) ( ) ( ) ( )GAPGAGAApRGAPGALndApRR ..  +=
                       (3)
The first term denotes the risk during approach or
landing, given that no go-around has been made, and
the second term denotes the risk during approach or
                                                      
1
 Use is made of the normal distribution to calculate risk
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go-around, given that a go-around has been made. In
case a go-around has been made we have the
probability:
( ) ( ) 11 ≡−= GAPGAP              (4)
According to the Bayesian rule we also have in
general for the union of sets in Eq.(3):( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )GAGAApR
GARGAApRGAGAApR
GALndApR
LndRGAApRGALndApR




−+=
−+=
             (5)
In case the risk of an event on the approach, ‘R(Ap)’
is independent of the risk of an event at landing,
‘R(Lnd)’ or go-around, ‘R(GA)’ (as is assumed here),
then one can write for the right-hand terms in Eq.(5):
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )GARGAApRGAGAApR
LndRGAApRGALndApR
.
.
=
=


           (6)
The risk probabilities can be further defined for the
approach, landing and/or go-around phases(1),(2).
The landing risk ‘R(Lnd)’ was calculated differently
for the experiment in 1996 than for the one in 1994.
In the 1994 experiment only touchdown event data
were used in the probability calculations (i.e. one
event per landing), whereas in the 1996 experiment
the landing roll-out segment data statistics were used
to calculate the probabilities to exceed various
parameters, using normal distribution functions (1), (2).
7.3 Risk conditions
The above risk probabilities were calculated, based
on a number of conditions which were stipulated to
be a risk. For the airborne part of flight the safety
risk contained the risk to exceed the following terms:
• stall margin  0<mrgnα
• max. airspeed Va > 190 kts (flaps 30º; approach
segment) or 238 kts (flaps 10º; go-around
segment)
• load factor Az >+2.5g or < 0g (structural limits)
• glide slope deviation <-2 dots (on the approach
only), or
• hILS < -15 m (1996 experiment) for the final
segment, or
• mean climb rate<0 (only for the go-around
segment).
In case of touchdown (TD) or landing/roll-out, the
following conditions were defined to be a risk when
exceeded:
• landing before touchdown point, i.e. xTD<-243 m
• risk of runway overrun at the end. i.e.
xmax> 2475 m
• risk of landing or getting off the runway,
|yTD|>16 m
• tail strike, 011>TDθ
• engine pod strike with the ground: 05.8>TDϕ
• exceeding max. wheel speed, GSTD>203 kts
• exceeding vertical speed at ground impact,
we>600 ft/min (landing gear structural limits).
The risk of exceeding the vertical acceleration at
ground impact had been deleted, as it correlated
strongly with the vertical speed at touchdown,
making the two probabilities dependent. In fact,
using one criterion will suffice. Note that some of the
above values depend also on the aircraft type being
used in the simulation experiment.
8 Conduct of experiments
This chapter will describe in more detail the conduct
of the experiments, the experimental design and test
matrix. In the 1994 experiment, performed in
collaboration with the GARTEUR Flight Mechanics
Action Group FM(AG07) members of ONERA,
DLR and NLR, use was made of four national crews
and two international crews (one from France and
one from Germany). Four Dutch crews were used in
the 1996 experiment. Both experiments concentrated
on the approach and landing (or go-around) phase.
Take-offs in windshear, although interesting enough,
have not yet been considered due to limited
resources. Due to the sheer size of the amount of data
a limited selection of data was taken for further
analysis and discussion in this paper.
8.1 Experimental design for the 1994 experiment
The experimental factors that play a role here are:
• icon display (yes, no). The combination of icon
display without speed feedback was also called
display type A.
• speed feedback (no, yes). The combination of
speed feedback with the icon display was also
called display type B. Also without the icon
display the speed feedback mechanism was
functional, in that it raised the alert thresholds,
hence “delaying” the timing of the alerts.
• rainfall (no, yes). In case of rainfall the average
intensity was about 30 mm/hr, and was
concentrated within the vortex-rings of the
microbursts. The rainfall rate of 30 mm/h was a
reasonable amount of precipitation of “every-day
life”, yet would still be enough to influence the
performance of the lidar such, that the effective
look-ahead range, when fully immersed in this
-10-
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precipitation, would degrade from about 8000 m
to about 2000 m. Rainfall was an experimental
variable only in case an icon display was present,
as without a display rainfall would not imply a
“visual“ awareness to the flight crews.
Concerning the objectives a sub-selection was made.
In order to limit the scope of this paper the first two
factors mentioned above were combined into the
following factor and levels:
• icon display type (none, type A, type B).
The icon display type factor was used as a repeated
measures, or within-subjects factor in a repeated
measures ANalysis Of VAriance (ANOVA) test, to
determine the significance of the effect. The repeats
were made within crews.
In the work done by GARTEUR FM(AG07)
additional experimental factors were evaluated(11),
but these will not be discussed here for the sake of
brevity.
A set of 4 weather scenarios was used, with the
definition based on the location of the MicroBurst
(MB) position relative to the approach path (‘no-
threat’ [i.e. icon(s) outside the alerting zone] or a
‘threat’ position [i.e. icon intersecting the alerting
zone]), and the strength of the MB (‘severe’ or ‘not
severe’), classified as given in Table 2. This factor of
‘weather scenario’ was used as a grouping factor in
the ANOVA.
TABLE 2 Weather scenarios as function of MB
position and strength
MB position MB strength weather
scenario
no threat
not severe
(Fav -0.10)
benign
severe
(Fav<-0.10)
fly-by
threat
not severe
(Fav -0.10)
penetrate
severe
  (Fav<-0.10)
worst-case
Each class of windshear scenario contained several
weather cases, each one having been made up of one
or more microbursts at various locations and
strengths, so that in fact there was one single
classification but not one specific weather case
offered to the crews.
8.2 Experimental design for the 1996 experiment
In the 1996 experiment several windshear sensor
options, in combination with 2 go-around
procedures, were tested. The main experimental
repeated measures factors of interest, and the levels,
were:
• windshear sensor type: 1) reactive sensor with
an ordinary weather radar (WX+R), 2) the
Airborne Doppler Radar (ADR) only, and 3) the
ADR with the reactive sensor combined
(ADR+R).
• type of go-around: 1) WTA-type or 2) Standard
type. In the first case the pilot was NOT allowed
to change the aircraft’s configuration but to keep
it fixed while going around after a windshear
alert, unless out of windshear and above 1000 ft.
In the second case he had to retract flaps (to 20
degrees) as soon as possible as well as the
landing gear as soon as the flaps were at 20 deg,
regardless of whether or not a windshear existed
at the time of go-around. He was allowed to
delay retracting flaps only in case of imminent
ground impact or when below reference speed.
• type of escape maneuver (straight, turning). An
effort was made to test the effect of making a
turning escape maneuver in the go-around,
rather than to go around straight, in the presence
of shears. This factor turned out to be difficult to
control, as in some cases where crews were
supposed to go straight they turned, in defiance
of “ATC instructions”, while in other cases,
where they were expected to make a turn in the
go-around, they did not (apparently they got
used too much to not having been allowed to
make turning escape maneuvers that they didn’t
ask for it). As result of this only 4 valid cases
(crew and weather combinations) remained,
within which a full repeat was made, with in one
case a straight go-around made, and in the repeat
case a turning go-around. One case was flown
with the ADR sensor, the other 3 cases were
flown with the ADR+R sensor combination.
As grouping factor was used:
• rainfall intensity: dry (<20 dBZ), medium wet
(20-40 dBZ) and (very) wet (>40 dBZ). Four of
the FAA weather cases had rain core
reflectivities which were sometimes above 50
dBZ(!) Of special interest of course were those
cases where there was a dry microburst, to see
what advantage the combination of the ADR and
the reactive sensor might have.
Other factors not discussed here were the effect of
rainfall on the deterioration of the airplane’s
aerodynamics, and another labeling concept to be
shown on the Primary Flight Display (PFD).
Although FAA weather cases were used exclusively
in the experiment of 1996, also here a weather
classification analogous to the experiment of 1994
-11-
NLR-TP-99255
was performed, using the factors ‘FBAR2 position’
and ‘FBARmax level’, as given in Table 3.
The factor ‘FBAR pos’ determines the position of the
center of the FBAR>0.13 contour which may show
up on the radar. A threat was defined as an icon
infringing the approach path. No-threat icons were
positioned using subjective judgement. The
‘FBARmax level’ determines the overall maximum
FBAR that may occur, i.e. whether FBAR is above
or below the maximum critical hazard level 0.13,
above which an icon may be present on the ADR
radar. Using this classification table allows these
wind scenarios to be coupled to the wind scenarios of
the second experiment.
TABLE 3   Weather classification as function
 of FBAR position and max. level
FBAR pos FBARmax level weather
classification
no-threat
no hazard
(FBARmax<0.13)
benign
hazard
(FBARmax 0.13)
fly-by
threat
no hazard
(FBARmax<0.13)
penetrate
hazard
(FBARmax 0.13)
worst-case
9 Data collection
The advantage of having a simulator is the easy
access to a host of “flight data”. The various
performance data were processed into statistical
measures such as mean, maximum, minimum and
standard deviation of the performance parameters for
several flight segments. The flight segments of
interest in this paper were the following:
segment     altitude range
approach    from 1800 ft to 50 ft or moment of
    go-around
go-around  from moment of go-around initiation
   to moment of altitude capture
landing    from moment of touchdown event
   (1994 exp.), to end of roll-out (1996 exp.)
In this paper the objective results will be given in
three dimensions, viz. “performance”, “safety risk”
and ”workload”. From the many variables available
for “performance” the choice made here was to use
the min. stall margin during flight (i.e. on the
approach or go-around if made), which correlated
well with airspeed for example. Safety risk was
calculated using the risk model (§7), and workload
was determined from the pilot/copilot questionnaires
                                                      
2
 FBAR is the 1km averaged radar-F from Eq.(1).
using the McDonnell rating scale(17) to judge the
demand on the pilot.
Subjective results are related to such things as
situational awareness, usefulness of the (icon)
display, acceptance of procedures, etc. All these data
were collected from the questionnaires and were
processed statistically.
The statistical significance (p-level) of a particular
test or result represents the probability of error that is
involved in accepting the observed results as valid,
i.e. as “representative of the population”. The p-level
of 0.01 for example indicates a one percent
probability (1 in 100 cases) that the relation between
the variables found in the sample is based on chance.
The significance levels for the various statistical tests
used were p=0.01 (1 in 100) in case of highly
significant differences, p=0.05   (1 in 20) in case of a
significant difference, and p=0.10 (1 in 10) in case of
a weakly significant difference.
In order to evaluate the human performance,
workload measures were given by both the Pilot-
Flying (PF) and the Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF), so as to
allow the crew’s workload to be evaluated, i.e. PF
and PNF together.
Also other questions were asked about the nature of
the alerts, type of displays, etc. using quite extensive
questionnaires. Important variables measured or
determined were the go-around rate, type of alerts
and timing of alerts, and other crew-related
functionalities.
10 Results and discussion
The results of the experiments will be discussed
regarding the three dimensions for each of the main
factors of interest mentioned before.
Furthermore, in case go-arounds were made only
straight go-arounds were selected, so as to avoid
having additional variability in the performance due
to having made turning escape maneuvers or not.
Also only “dry” runs were taken, except when
rainfall was an experimental factor.
10.1 Laser-driven icon display and rainfall
From the wealth of information and data available, a
sub-selection was made to portray the results
concerning the laser-driven icon display type (i.e.
icon display and speed feedback with the display),
together with the results of the experimental factor of
rainfall intensity.
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10.1.1 Effect of icon display type
The main effect of the icon display type on the min.
stall margin turned out to be quite significant, in a
statistical sense (F(2,30)=14.10; p<.0000). The mean
values of the min. stall margin as well as the go-
around rate are given as function of the type of icon
display (none, type A or type B) in Figure 5. As the
figure shows especially the type A display had the
highest stall margin and lowest go-around rate, and
in case of no display the min. stall margin was worst,
and the go-around rate was the highest. Breaking this
down per weather scenario, see Figure 6, shows that
the improvement in stall margin due to the display
occurred with all scenarios except the penetrate
scenario, and the best improvement occurred with the
benign weather scenario. Across the board display
type A looks like the “best” display type, with an
exception perhaps for the worst-case scenario, where
display type B (i.e. with speed feedback) had a
slightly better (min.) stall margin.
The effect of the icon display type on safety risk, per
weather scenario, is shown in Figure 7. Although
overall the display type effect was not significant, it
was significant (F(2,30)=5.339; p<.0104) for the
“fly-by” weather scenario. As Figure 7 shows the
worst risk for this scenario was obtained in case of
no display, while display type A again had the best,
i.e. lowest safety risk. For all the other weather
scenarios there was no significant difference due to
icon display type. Apparently it was just for this “fly-
by” scenario where the presence of the icon display
made a big difference in circumnavigating
windshear. As the go-around rate shows (see later)
the improved safety risk was obtained at the same
time with a zero go-around rate. The worse risk for
the no-display case apparently was caused by going
around instead of landing!
The effect of the icon display type on the crew’s
workload is given in Figure 8 as function of display
type, and in Figure 9 as function of weather scenario,
per display type. The type of display had a
significant main effect on the crew’s workload
(F(2,6)=3.29; p<.0438), see Figure 8, where the
workload for display type B (i.e. icon display with
speed feedback) was higher than for display type A,
or even no display. As the speed feedback tended to
drive crews to continue the approach, and to go
around much later than in case of display type A, it
was generally harder work for the crews to negotiate
the shear. Figure 9 makes it evident that much was to
be gained by adding an icon display (of type A)
especially for the benign weather case. Display type
B as well as no display yielded the same level of
workload. Apparently the speed feedback mechanism
drove the pilot’s behavior closer to that for the no
display situation (i.e. to continue flight towards a
possible threat), and as result did not improve the
workload. Addition of an icon display was also
accompanied by a great reduction in go-around rate
(see Figure 11 later). For the worst-case scenario,
however, the type A icon display yielded a much
higher workload than for type B or no display at all.
In all cases go-arounds were made anyhow, but in
case of display type A the crews also saw the
ominously looking icon staring in their face, whereas
with type B the threat may have looked less ominous
due to changes in the color of the icons.
An interesting variable to compare workload with is
the in-situ maximum windshear hazard (min. Fav)
which the airplane experienced during flight. This
variable is shown as function of weather scenario,
per display type, in Figure 10. This parameter was
determined by the on-board reactive sensor. Please
note that a negative value of Fav means performance
loss, and vice-versa. Overall the type of display had a
highly significant main effect (F(2,30)=8.13;
p<.0015) on min. Fav, with the lowest (average) max.
hazard (Fav= -.05) for display type A, and the highest
hazard (Fav = -.20) in case of no display, and type B
in between (Fav= -0.13). Figure 10 shows that the
greatest hazards occurred with the worst-case
scenario without a display (obviously), but also with
the benign scenario(!). Looking back, Figure 9
reveals that the workload is proportional to the max.
windshear hazard in case of the benign weather
scenario, but is inversely proportional to the max.
windshear hazard in case of the worst-case scenario.
Apparently the higher workload for display type A in
the worst-case scenario led to a better, i.e. lower
windshear hazard, while in case of the benign
scenario it was mainly the visual information of the
weather which led pilots to believe it was an easy,
low-workload situation, however with some
surprises! Notice though, looking at Figure 7, that
none of this correlated with the safety risk, however,
which showed the worst risk for the no-display
situation in case of the fly-by scenario instead.
Another interesting variable to judge the effect of the
display type is the go-around rate, shown in Figure
11 as function of weather scenario, per display type.
For the more “hazardous” scenarios, like the worst-
case and penetrate scenarios, there is not much
difference due to display, but especially for the more
“complex” scenarios, in terms of decision making,
there is quite an effect of display. In case of the
benign scenario the go-around rate dropped from 100
percent to zero for the type A icon display, a great
improvement when considering the safety risk
(Fig.7), stall margin (Fig.6) or operational
implications. In case of the fly-by scenario both
display types (A and B) reduced the go-around rate
(from 80 percent to zero), as intended since it was
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supposed to be a “fly-by” situation. The reduction in
go-around rate was even accompanied by a (slight)
increase in the min. stall margin (Fig.6), and a
significant reduction in safety risk (Fig.7). In the case
of the penetrate scenario, however, one can notice an
increase in go-around rate from zero to about 20
percent, when adding an icon display. Considering
the amount of runs (6), this amounted to one go-
around for type A and one for type B. From an
operational point of view this could be interpreted as
two go-arounds too many because of the addition of
an icon display. Closer analysis indicated the go-
arounds were made because of the aircraft becoming
unstable on the approach, and not because of
displayed windshear features.
In this comparison of icon display types within crews
it turned out that the pilot’s rating of the usefulness
of the icon display type did not differ statistically
significantly between display types, although the
usefulness of icon display type B was rated slightly
better than that of type A.
When ranking the various display types among one
another in terms of pilot’s preference, using Saaty’s
method(12), then having a display was preferred far
above not having a display, and display type A
ranked slightly better than type B, see Figure 12,
instead of less, as indicated above. This latter was
explained by the pilots in that, in hindsight, they did
not like the speed feedback with the display, as it
drove them towards continuing the flight into a
weather situation which normally would have
compelled them to go around. Making a go-around in
such a once-in-a-lifetime situation was considered
quite acceptable to them.
10.1.2 Effect of rainfall
The effect of rainfall was initially observed to be not
as dramatic as it turned out to be. A more detailed
analysis indicated that rainfall had a much greater
effect on the efficacy of the icon display than hitherto
assumed. In Figure 13 the effect of rainfall on the
min. stall margin is shown as function of weather
scenario. Rainfall had a significant main effect
(F(1,10)=6.70; p<.0270). On average the min. stall
margin became one degree less with rainfall, and
Figure 13 shows that this occurred especially with
the penetrate and worst-case scenarios, where in the
latter case the min. stall margin reduced significantly
(p<.0686) from 7º without rainfall, to 6º with rainfall.
Although the change in min. stall margin was even
larger for the penetrate scenario, the difference
turned out not to be significant (too much spread in
the data). The go-around rate for this latter scenario
also went up, from about 20 percent to 100 percent
(see later). Notice though, that for the benign weather
scenario the min. stall margin improved when having
rainfall, viz. from 8 to 11 degrees, while the go-
around rate dropped somewhat.
There was also a significant (F(1,9)=3.92; p<.0792)
interaction between display type (A, B) and rainfall,
see Figure 14. The performance with icon display
type A showed a much greater sensitivity to rainfall
than it did with type B. The min. stall margin
dropped from 9.5º to 7.5º due to rainfall for type A,
but remained unchanged at about 8.5º for type B.
Apparently the “filtering” effect of the speed
feedback concept in the type B icon display made it
also less sensitive to the effect of rainfall, which
would have a somewhat similar effect on visual
appearance as speed feedback, viz. a reduction in
icon size, sometimes with icons disappearing
completely because of a reduction in the detection
range.
Also the go-around rate for the same conditions as
for the min. stall margin is shown in Figure 15. It
becomes clear that the reduction in min. stall margin
for the penetrate scenario is accompanied by an
increase in go-around rate, from zero to 100 percent.
Partly the effect of rainfall in terms of min. stall
margin and go-around rate can be attributed to
reduced visual cues (rainfall also reduced the visual
slant range), leading crews to go around more often,
but also to a reduction in size of the icons, inducing
pilots to believe the situation was much more benign
than it really was. As this was a “penetrate” type of
scenario anyway, the effect of rainfall also led to a
greater degree of penetration of shears which, in
combination with the reduced visual cues, would
lead to a greater go-around rate at a later moment in
flight.
It turned out that rainfall had no significant effect on
flight safety risk whatsoever. In one case the flight
safety risk value reached a value of 0.96 (worst-case
scenario, in rainfall, with type A display), which was
due to the mean vertical speed in the go-around
becoming just negative. It turned out that in this run
the max. angle of attack exceeded stall, i.e. the min.
stall margin was -1.1º, but no crash resulted from
this. When applying a non-parametric test, in order to
cope with this outlier, then rainfall was no longer a
significant factor. When deleting this case, then
rainfall also was no longer a significant factor. More
data is needed to be able to be more specific.
Rainfall did have a significant main effect
(F(1,22)=7.56; p<.0117) on the crew’s workload, see
Figure 16. Especially for the penetrate scenario the
workload increased with rainfall to even above the
level for the worst-case scenario, whereas for the
benign scenario it reduced with rainfall, although
only slightly. It is obvious that penetrating shears
with rain is a higher workload situation than without
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rainfall, as especially the visual cues “at the end” are
important for judging the aircraft’s position relative
to the runway, in order to decide whether or not to go
around. As Figure 15 shows the rainfall condition in
general resulted in a higher rate of go arounds,
especially for the penetrate scenario.
Pilots did not notice a reduced usefulness of the icon
display due to rainfall.
Based on the performance, safety risk, crew
workload and pilot’s preference the best type of icon
display is type A, i.e. the laser-driven icon display
WITHOUT speed feedback.
10.2 Radar-driven icon display
In the case of the 1996 experiment it was especially
the windshear radar icon display (WX+Reactive
sensor combination as the baseline, the ADR and the
ADR+Reactive sensor) and the type of go-around
(WTA or Standard), which were the major
parameters of interest. The runs were flown on a
number of weather scenarios, which included
rainfall, expressed in terms of the max. dBZ level
that existed in this scenario. In case of a go-around
only straight go-arounds were selected.
10.2.1 Effect of sensor type
The effect of the type of sensor on performance (i.e.
min. stall margin) is shown per weather scenario in
Figure 17. The type of sensor had a significant main
effect on the min. stall margin (F(2,12)=6.15;
p<.0145), with the highest min. margin for the ADR
sensor (average 8.8º), and the lowest min. margin for
the WX+R sensor combination (av. value 7.6º). It is
clear that for the two “easy” scenarios (the benign
and the fly-by scenarios) there is no difference
between the sensors, but especially for the more
difficult ones there is a difference. For the penetrate
scenario the ADR sensor yielded an outlying better
(p<.0555) min. stall margin than for the other two
sensor types. This was achieved at the same time
with a lower go-around rate (see Fig.18). So here
continuing the approach apparently led to better stall
margins than by aborting it. For the worst-case
scenario both ADR type of sensors performed better,
at the p=.000112 level, than the baseline WX+R
sensor combination. This improvement turned out to
be even more pronounced for the Standard type of
go-around (about 3º) than for the WTA type of go-
around (about 1.5º).
The effect of the sensors on the go-around rate is
shown in Figure 18. As expected the go-around rate
is very low, and even zero for the ADR sensor, for
the “easy” scenarios. For the penetrate scenario with
ADR sensor the go-around rate reached a low of
about 20 percent, whereas for the other two sensors
the go-around rate went up to about 80 percent. For
the worst-case scenario the go-around rate was 100
percent, as expected. Despite the same go-around
rate for this scenario, a better stall margin for the
ADR-type of sensors (Fig.17) could only be the
result of having gone around earlier, as was
confirmed by checking on the moment of go-around.
The average go-around distance from touchdown for
this scenario, based on 3 crews, was about -3000 m
(i.e. before touchdown) for the WX+R sensor, but for
the ADR sensor it was -5500 m, and for the ADR+R
sensor combination it was -5000 m (i.e. a little later
than with the ADR). This difference in go-around
distance between the WX+R and the ADR-type of
sensors of 2-2.5 km accounted for the worse min.
stall margin for the WX+R sensor combination. The
closer go-around distance of -3000 m for the
WX+Reactive sensor was due in part to dry
microbursts, which were undetectable by the WX
radar alone. The reactive sensor gave a later warning
in this case than the ADR sensor did.
The type of sensor did not have any significant main
effect on flight safety risk whatsoever, however, for
one particular weather scenario it did. In Figure 19
the flight safety risk is shown as function of weather
scenario, per sensor type. For the worst-case scenario
the flight safety risk for the WX+R sensor
combination (R=4.0*10-4) was significantly higher
(F(1,6)=4.656; p<.0743) than for the ADR or the
ADR+R sensor (.01-.40*10-4). Also for the benign
scenario the WX+R sensor combination scored much
worse than for the other sensor types, however this
time the difference was (just) not statistically
significant (F(1,6)=3.368; p<.116) due to more
spread. More data is needed to be conclusive about
this.
The in-situ max. windshear hazard (min. Fav), as
experienced by the aircraft, is shown in Figure 20.
Clearly one can see the benefit of the ADR icon
display types by the drop in min. Fav for the worst-
case scenario from a value of -0.20 down to below
the alert level (-0.13). This alert level would trigger
the ADR alert logic. Notice that for the worst-case
scenario the max. windshear hazard, as experienced
(on average) by the airplane in case of an ADR type
of sensor, never was above the warning alert level of
-0.13, so the warning alert from the ADR, which
triggered the crews into making a go-around, was a
timely one.
The effect of the type of sensor on the crew’s
workload is shown in Figure 21 (left-hand axis),
together with the go-around rate along the right-hand
axis. The type of sensor had a significant main effect
(F(2,24)=4.03; p<.0310) on the crew’s workload. It
was especially the workload with the ADR sensor
which was significantly (p<.0746) more than for the
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other sensors, accompanied by a lower go-around
rate. A closer inspection revealed that it was
especially for the worst-case scenario where the
workload with the ADR sensor was significantly
higher (F(1,12)=5.659; p<.0348) than for any other
sensor or sensor combination. Also, especially for the
benign scenario, the workload for the ADR+R sensor
was significantly lower (F(1,12)=6.088; p<.0296)
than for the WX+R sensor.
Furthermore there was a highly significant
interaction between windshear sensor and the type of
go-around, F(2,24)=7.32; p<.0033, see Figure 22.
This was because in the specific case of the ADR+R
sensor, the workload for the WTA type of go-around
was significantly lower (F(1,12)=28.49; p<.000177)
than the workload for the Standard type. Further
probing revealed that this was especially due to the
Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF). This can be explained by the
fact that for this type of sensor the average go-around
distance was about 700 m less (see §10.2.1) than for
the ADR sensor alone. In this case, carrying out a
WTA type of go-around meant for the copilot to not
retract the flaps and landing gear, as opposed to the
Standard type of go-around where he had to perform
these duties, with a resulting higher workload.
Retracting flaps and the landing gear in such a “high
stress” situation (i.e. a fairly late go-around)
apparently meant a much higher mental load for the
PNF. The workload of the PF remained fairly
constant, as the mental workload of his flying task
did not change much.
Also there was a highly significant effect
(Kruskal-Wallis test H(2,N=96)=9.017; p=.0110) on
the situational awareness for the fly-by and the
worst-case weather scenarios. The situational
awareness is shown in Figure 23. For these two
scenarios, which are the most “interesting” ones from
a situational awareness point of view, the situational
awareness scored “fair-to-good” for the WX+R
sensor, which increased to “good” for the ADR and
the ADR+R sensor combination. Obviously the
presence of windshear icons, through the ADR
feature, helped increase the situational awareness.
Also, for the same weather conditions as above, the
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test showed the
weather radar’s display usefulness to be better for
the ADR and ADR+R sensor (“useful”) than for the
WX+R sensor (“rather useful”) (H(2,N=96)=9.786;
p=.0075). Mean values of the usefulness of the
weather radar display are given in Figure 24. It is, for
the same reasons as above, obvious why the
usefulness was rated better for the ADR type of
sensor.
10.2.2 Effect of type of go-around
The effect of the type of go-around on the min. stall
margin is shown in Figure 25 as function of weather
scenario. The highly significant main effect of go-
around type (F(1,6)=34.24; p<.0011) was an average
one degree lower min. stall margin for the Standard
type of go-around, and this figure shows that this
occurred especially with the penetrate (2.5º) and the
worst-case (1º) scenarios. It was not expected that
this trend would emerge. The interaction between
sensors and go-around type, see Figure 26, nearly
becoming significant, further showed that this lower
stall margin occurred especially with the WX+R
sensor, where the min. stall margin was highly
significantly lower (F(1,6)=23.68; p<.00280) for the
WTA type than for the Standard type of go-around.
In view of the effect of sensors it becomes obvious
that the combination of WX+R sensor and Standard
type of go-around is not the best one. This seems to
support the notion that, despite the presence of a
weather radar, the performance in windshear is
driven mainly by the functioning of the reactive
sensor only. Hence the currently applied WTA type of
go-around for this WX+R sensor combination seems
to be suitable.
The best overall min. stall margin was obtained with
the ADR sensor, regardless of the type of go-around
or weather scenario.
It turned out that the type of go-around had no
significant effect on flight safety risk, although the
mean values tended to double from 1.0*10-4 for the
WTA type of go-around, to about 2.0*10-4 for the
Standard type of go-around. When including the
results of the fourth crew then the effect did become
significant. However, the fourth crew repeated the
runs of the first crew, but with a lower critical hazard
level (Fcrit=0.10) set for the ADR warning threshold,
so in this case the experiment set-up becomes
unbalanced. More data runs (i.e. crews) are required
in order to be able to decisively determine the effect
of the go-around type on flight safety risk.
The effect of the type of go-around on the demand
on the crew is shown in Figure 27 as function of
weather scenario. A significant interaction between
weather scenario and go-around type (F(3,12)=3.67;
p<.0437) indicated a dependency of workload on the
type of go-around, further depending upon the type
of weather scenario, such as is suggested by the
figure. The only significant difference occurred for
the penetrate scenario, where the workload for the
Standard type of go-around was significantly higher
(F(1,12)=6.984; p<.0215) than for the WTA type.
This increase in the crew’s workload for this scenario
was entirely due to a higher (mental) workload for
the PNF, as explained before.
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Another significant interaction existed between the
type of go-around and crew member (F(1,12)=17.24;
p<.0013), shown in Figure 28, which indicates that
the workload for the PF was significantly lower for
the Standard type than for the WTA type of go-
around, while that of the PNF was higher. The PNF
had to perform more duties, and in quick succession,
in case of the Standard type of go-around. right after
go-around initiation, putting (apparently) a higher
mental stress on the PNF, while the PF only had to
perform the same type of operation, but without the
long wait for aircraft “clean up”, hence with a lower
mental load. This interesting feature of interaction
between crewmembers could only have been
determined by having queried both pilots.
An indication of the aircrew’s go-around procedure
acceptance was obtained from questions in the
questionnaire, where each PF rated the acceptance of
the particular go-around procedure (in case of a go-
around), on a scale of from -4 (fully rejected) to +4
(fully accepted), with 0 as the neutral point. In
general both go-around procedures (WTA or
Standard) were rated better than neutral and were not
significantly different from one another, with a slight
preference for the Standard type. It was expected that
the Standard go-around procedure would be more
acceptable with the ADR or the ADR+Reactive
sensor, and that the WTA type of go-around would be
more acceptable with the WX+Reactive sensor,
however, this interaction between sensors and go-
around type was non-existent. Therefore no clear
pilot’s preference about the combination of type of
sensors and go-around procedures exists.
Although the interaction between the go-around type
and weather scenario was not significant
(F(1,1)=12.35; p<.1765) the trend it shows, see
Figure 29, was that the Standard go-around
procedure was accepted better in case of the
penetrate scenario, where late go-arounds generally
were made, while in case of the worst-case scenario
there was no clear preference for any particular go-
around procedure. It should be reminded that there
were only a few complete repeats within the 3 crews
available, so more data are required to be more
specific. When including e.g. the results of the 4th
crew then the Standard type of go-around procedure
tended to be accepted better than the WTA type,
regardless of the type of weather scenario. Pilot
comments supported this trend, stating that they
would prefer to make the Standard type of go-around
procedure (i.e. retract gear and flaps) when warned
well before the real windshear threat. When going
around in the windshear itself, e.g. due to a reactive
sensor alert, then they didn’t mind leaving the
aircraft’s configuration unchanged (i.e. WTA type) as
they climbed away from the threat. They did object,
however, to climbing away early, while having to
keep the flaps and gear down until 1000 ft AGL, as
they preferred to accelerate faster.
10.2.3 Effect of precipitation level
The windshear cases per weather scenario were also
classified in terms of the max. precipitation level as
‘dry’ (precipitation <20 dBZ), ‘medium’ (wet) (20-
40 dBZ) and (very) ’wet’ (>40 dBZ). The factor of
precipitation level was not really independent, as
with each level of precipitation within one weather
scenario, a different windshear (i.e. microburst) case
applied. Therefore, looking at differences in
precipitation might also mean looking at differences
between microbursts. In the 1996 experiment it
turned out that, within the (6) repeats per crew that
were made, there were from one to two windshear
cases per weather scenario for each class of
precipitation level, as indicated in Table 4 (only
straight go-arounds were selected).
The effect of sensors per precipitation level on
performance will at least be interesting to see, in
order to determine if the functioning of the
windshear sensor will be affected by the amount of
precipitation.
In terms of min. stall margin the effect of
precipitation, per sensor, is shown in Figure 30. In
case of dry weather the type of sensor did not matter
for the min. stall margin. For the medium wet
precipitation case there was a significant effect of
TABLE 4 No. of weather cases per precipitation level
              per weather scenario
precipitation
level
weather
scenario
no.
Dry (<20 dBZ)
benign
fly-by
penetrate
worst-case
2
2
2
1
Medium (wet)
(20-40 dBZ)
benign
fly-by
penetrate
worst-case
2
2
1
1
(Very) wet
(>40 dBZ)
benign
fly-by
penetrate
worst-case
2
2
1
1
sensor, with the WX+Reactive sensor being the
worst, and the ADR being the best. For the (very)
wet precipitation case the differences between
sensors became even larger, with again the
WX+Reactive sensor being the worst, and the ADR
being the best. Maximum (average) difference in
min. stall margin amounted to 2 degrees in this case.
Especially the WTA type of go-around in the (very)
wet case gave rise to low stall margins. It is apparent
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that the use of the ADR, or ADR+R, type of sensor is
a big help in improving the safety by increasing the
minimum stall margin relative to the baseline case
(i.e. WX+R sensor). Reasons for this are obvious:
more situational awareness, especially of the more
dangerous shears.
The effect of precipitation, coupled with windshear
sensor, on flight safety risk is shown in Figure 31. In
case of dry weather there was no effect of the type of
sensor on the flight safety risk. In case of medium
wet precipitation, the ADR+R sensor combination
had a significantly lower (p<.0598) flight safety risk
than the other sensor types. Although for the wet
precipitation case it looks as if there is a large(r)
outlying risk value of 6.5*10-4 for the WX+R sensor,
mainly attributable to the WTA type of go-around,
this was not statistically significant, however
(p<.183), although it does indicate a trend: the
WX+R sensor combination, especially in case of the
WTA type of go-around, yielded a higher flight safety
risk than with the ADR type of sensors.
The effect of precipitation, per sensor type, on the
crew’s workload is shown in Figure 32. Only in case
of medium precipitation the workload for the ADR
sensor was significantly higher (F(1,12)=6.707;
p<.0237) than for the other two sensor types. This
“upward” dip in the trend with rainfall for this type
of sensor was mainly due to the PF’s workload for
the WTA type of go-around being higher than for the
other two sensor types and go-around type.
Apparently waiting with the “clean up” of the
aircraft, flying in a “high drag” situation (and lower
speeds), was not liked by the PF in particular.
The usefulness of the WX radar display also
depended upon the amount of precipitation, as well
as sensors, see Figure 33. Especially for the dry
situation the ADR or ADR+R sensor (obviously)
scored better than the WX+R sensor (Kruskal-Wallis
test H(1, N=43) = 3.525; p=.0605), as in this case the
ADR could still show windshear icons, whereas the
WX+R did not show any weather at all. For the
medium and wet precipitation levels the difference in
usefulness between sensors was no longer
significant, in a statistical sense. Overall the
usefulness of the radar display increased significantly
with precipitation, using the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test (H(2,N=186)=27.51; p=.0000), and was
best for the (very) wet precipitation level.
10.2.4 Effect of escape maneuver
Generally, when making turning maneuvers the stall
margin is expected to decrease. The effect of escape
maneuver turned out not to be significant for the
min. stall margin, and in addition, contrary to
expectations, the min. stall margin increased by
about 1.8º when making turning escape maneuvers.
Also concerning the flight safety risk the maneuver
effect was not significant, but also here the flight
safety risk improved somewhat for turning escape
maneuvers. This trend was similar to what was found
in the 1994 experiment (not reported here)(11) and by
Visscher(18), who found the effect to be very
significant.
There was a significant effect of escape maneuver,
however, on the crew’s workload (F(1,6)=5.83;
p<.0523). In Figure 34 the effect of the escape
maneuver is shown as function of crewmember (PF,
PNF). For turning escape maneuvers the workload
was higher than for straight go-arounds. Although
not significant, Figure 34 does show that the increase
in workload for turning escape maneuvers was
stronger for the PNF than for the PF.
10.2.5 Windshear severity experienced
For each run the pilot filled out in the questionnaire a
measure about the windshear severity he experienced
“during the flight”, on a scale from ‘none’, ‘light’,
‘moderate’, ‘heavy’, ‘severe’ to ‘extreme’. It is
interesting to see how his subjective rating varies
with the application of different sensors and/or go-
around procedures, and how it compares with the in-
situ max. windshear hazard measured by the reactive
sensor (min F
av
). For a selected data set of straight
go-around cases (obviously on penetrate and worst-
case windshear scenarios) the mean values for the
windshear severity (subjective) and hazard
(objective) are given in Figure 35. The open symbols
are the subjectively determined severity values, and
the solid symbols are the objectively determined
hazard values. Circled symbols are for the WTA go-
around procedure, while the delta symbols are for the
Standard go-around procedure. It is striking to see
the good agreement between the subjective and
objective data, certainly for the ADR and the
ADR+R sensor. For the WX+R sensor the pilot rated
the windshear experienced with the WTA procedure
less severe than the measurements indicate. In his
subjective opinion the Standard go-around procedure
and the WX+R sensor combination led to a more
hazardous windshear situation than when making a
WTA type of go-around, although this difference did
not reach statistical significance, and also the
objective data did not show this trend. For the ADR
sensor there was no difference in subjective rating,
while for the ADR+R sensor combination he rated
the windshear severity less in case of the Standard
type of go-around than for the WTA type of go-
around, but also here this difference was not (yet)
significant, in a statistical sense. This latter
subjective finding is substantiated by the objectively
measured data (min. F
av
). In case of the Standard type
of go-around the type of windshear sensor did have a
significant effect on the subjectively rated windshear
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severity (Friedman’s ANOVA 2χ (N=8, df=2)=5.7;
p<.0579), and nearly so on the max. in-situ
windshear hazard (F(2,14)=2.58; p<.111), with the
ADR type of sensors yielding better, i.e. less
windshear hazard or severity.
It is possible to draw a scale of windshear severity
experienced by the pilot, versus the max. in-situ
windshear hazard experienced. This has been done
for all the cases, with the exception of the crash cases
(they gave rise to deviant results). The result is given
in Figure 36. A linear relationship has also been
drawn in the figure, showing the fairly linear
behavior of the pilot in rating the windshear severity,
compared to the in-situ max. windshear hazard. The
Fcrit level of -0.13 clearly separates the windshear
class of ‘moderate’, and less, from the windshear
class of ‘heavy’ and above. The large std. deviation
shows, however, that there was quite some spread in
the data, particularly in the light-to-heavy category.
11 Concluding remarks
Overall the results show improved flight safety and
good usefulness of the modern windshear hazard
displays evaluated. The speed feedback concept, i.e.
display type B, was not accepted by the pilots, as it
tended to drive them to continue flight into adverse
weather, with a commensurate increase in workload.
Making a go-around instead was considered a good
alternative to such unsafe conditions. The flight
performance with the laser-driven icon display was
rather adversely affected by precipitation. The stall
margin reduced, and also the go-around rate went up
with precipitation. The Airborne Doppler Radar
(ADR) was liked very well, providing better
situational awareness and being more useful than the
weather radar only. It was quite a “natural” sensor to
have, partly due to its integration with the weather
radar’s display. Pilots liked to have windshear cues
confirmed by weather cues. Obviously, the less
hazardous the cues that were visible the less useful
the icon display was rated.
Because of the limited amount of data no firm
statements can be made regarding the pilot’s
preference for a particular sensor/go-around type
combination. However, in view of the flight safety
risk and the minimum stall margin one can conclude
that the WX+R sensor should not be coupled with
the Standard type of go-around, but rather with the
WTA type of go-around. The performance and flight
safety risk improved with the ADR type of sensor.
More data is required to validate these findings.
Making turning escape maneuvers did not
significantly increase the stall margin or reduce the
flight safety risk, but the workload increased. Also
here more data is required to validate this finding.
In case of integration of multiple sensors, such as a
windshear radar and the reactive sensor for example,
a careful tuning must be established in order to
prevent loop-holes in the detection of hazardous
windshear. The best sensor combination is the ADR
with the reactive sensor. The reactive sensor also
detects the “dry” weather cases which may be missed
by the ADR sensor, while the ADR sensor detects
the wet windshear cases much more timely than the
reactive sensor does. From a first impression of the
crash cases which occurred in the 1996 experiment,
and pending further analysis, it may be
recommendable to not suppress the reactive sensor
caution alert when combined with the ADR, even
though its meaning (i.e. performance increase)
conflicts with that of the ADR.
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   FIGURE 1 Laser-driven icon display, showing red, amber and amber/red icons
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FIGURE 3 The ADR display, showing several windshear icons
FIGURE 4a hazard zone (A) and caution zone (B) for the NAV display
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FIGURE 4b Caution and hazard zone for the WX radar display, for takeoff and
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FIGURE 6 Min. stall margin as function of
weather scenario, per icon display type
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FIGURE 7 Safety risk as function of weather
scenario, per icon display type
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FIGURE 10 Effect of weather scenario, per
display type, on the max. in-situ windshear
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FIGURE 11 Go-around rate as function of
weather scenario, per icon display type
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FIGURE 12 Ranking of icon display
according to pilot’s preference
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FIGURE 13 Effect of rainfall, per weather
scenario, on the min. stall margin
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FIGURE 15 Effect of rainfall, per weather
scenario, on the go-around rate
dry (0 mm/h)
Wet (20 mm/h)
                 solid symbols: sign. (p<.0488) effect of rainfall
                              WEATHER SCENARIO
De
m
an
d 
on
 th
e 
cr
ew
4
Mildly dem.
5
Demanding6
7
Very dem.
benign
fly-by
penetrate
worst-case
figure15.stg
Rainfall :
FIGURE 16 Effect of rainfall, per scenario, on
the crew’s workload
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FIGURE 17 Effect of ADR sensor on min.
stall margin, per weather scenario
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FIGURE 18 Effect of sensor, per weather
scenario, on go-around rate
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FIGURE 19 Flight safety risk as function of
weather scenario, per sensor type
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FIGURE 21 Effect of sensor on crew
workload and go-around rate
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FIGURE 22 Effect of interaction between
sensor and type of go-around on the crew’s
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FIGURE 23 Effect of sensors on situational
awareness, for the fly-by and worst-case
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FIGURE 24 Effect of sensors, for fly-by and
worst-case scenario, on WX radar display
usefulness
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FIGURE 25 Effect of go-around type, per
weather scenario, on the min. stall margin
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FIGURE 26 Effect of go-around type, per
sensor, on the min. stall margin
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FIGURE 27 Effect of go-around type, per
weather scenario, on the crew’s workload
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FIGURE 28 Effect of interaction between go-
around type and crewmember on the crew’s
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FIGURE 29 Acceptance of go-around
procedure as function of weather scenario
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FIGURE 30 Effect of precipitation and
sensors on min. stall margin
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FIGURE 31 Effect of precipitation, per
sensor, on the flight safety risk
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FIGURE 32 Effect of precipitation, per sensor
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FIGURE 33 Usefulness of WX radar display
as function of precipitation level, per sensor
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FIGURE 34 Effect of escape maneuver, per
crewmember, on the demand on the crew
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FIGURE 35 Effect of sensors and go-around
procedures on subjective and objective
windshear hazard
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FIGURE 36 Relationship between subjective
windshear severity rating and max. in-situ
windshear hazard ‘min. Fav’
